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Stanek: On David Hume

On David Hume
Tomasz B. Stanek
After reviewing the (2012) Oxford
University Press title: Classic and
contemporary readings in the philosophy of
education by Steven M. Cahn, a common
philosophy of education text for the
undergraduate and graduate students, I
was surprised that the influence and the
philosophical imprint of David Hume
(who awakened Kant) was missing and
omitted. David Hume’s ideas were
monumentally important, not only to
Immanuel Kant, but also to those who
would eventually call educational
behaviorism their home.
To fill the void, I have included my
response to the ongoing debates and some
of the most intriguing questions regarding
Hume’s philosophical stance, his
suggestions, and perhaps seeds for those
who would build on their theories in the
nineteenth and twentieth century.
Although David Hume did not write any
specific chapter on education, his unique
approach to human learning makes his
philosophy very valuable today. His
insights cannot be ignored, just as we
cannot ignore Charles Darwin for his
‘missing’ notes on pedagogy. What is
remarkable about Hume’s contribution to
the philosophy of education is his stance
on the principles of solid experience as a
way to perceive reality,
constructs, or even the constructivist ideas
for linguistics, missing experience, or
fallacies.
David Hume is known for his radical
system of philosophical empiricism,
skepticism, and naturalism. His stance on
the existence of the innate ideas led him
to the basic assumption that all human
knowledge is ultimately founded in
experience and mainly through causation.
Some of his most influential publications,
namely, A treatise of human nature (1739)
and the consequent
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simplification or explanation of this work,
An enquiry concerning human understanding
(1748) were misunderstood at first but
became monumentally constructive for his
closest follower, Immanuel Kant. Simply
put, Hume advocated more for what
today is known as a psychological basis of
human nature and experience-based
learning or experience-based knowledge.
He argued that reason alone cannot
possibly be responsible for human
knowledge, however it is complementary
and assists inductive reasoning and
causality. Hume is regarded as one of the
most influential philosophers of Western
philosophy. The essay below reflects the
Humean wisdom and his perceptions of
the observable world, and is intended to
provoke thoughts, critiques, and
comparisons to those who conduct
research in the field of education and
human wisdom.
I shall organize this account around the
asking of three questions. The first
question for the discussion provides a
basic attempt at Hume’s position
regarding his basic theory of experiencebased causes. The second question
ponders his ideas on the Socratic concept
of akrasia. The final question deals with
Hume’s is-ought concept. Each
philosophical analysis of a particular
question is followed by its applicability to
the field of education.
Question 1
Hume offers two definitions of cause,
as a philosophical relation and as a natural
relation. What are we to make of these
two senses of cause — is Hume a realist,
anti-realist, subjectivist, or objectivist?
Hume describes two causal processes,
one that occurs in the outside world, and
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the other in our minds. To support this,
Hume provided two definitions of
causation, which lay at the heart of his
philosophical foundation, and represented
a different view of the same object or
relation. The association in this relation
should be understood as either a
philosophical or natural one. For clarity
in this paper, I will simply label the
definitions as A, and B respectively. The
first definition (A) of cause was defined by
Hume as, “An object precedent and
contiguous to another, and where all the
objects resembling the former are placed
in like relations of precedency and
contiguity to those objects, that resemble
the latter” (Norton et al., p. 114). The
second definition (B) defined cause as,
“An object precedent and contiguous to
another, and so united with it, that the
idea of the one determines the mind to
form the idea of the other, and the
impression of the one to form a more
lively idea of the other” (Norton et al., p.
114).
I believe that Hume supplied two
distinctive definitions of an experimental
method in his own quest to understand
reality and how that reality was related to
human learning. He has (A) eliminated,
and at the same time, (B) introduced
human bias (or individual perception), by
which the causation could be observed by
one definition (A), yet it could not be
realistically assessed by definition (B),
partly since our own imagination may
have created such causation.
Hume’s fascination with causation as
the basic foundation of his philosophy of
human understanding, perhaps led him to
draw some basic conclusions: (A)
causation occurs as it happens in nature
(observable or not) and (B) causation
exists as it is observed by the human
mind. What is perplexing here is the
notion that (A) could not be observed if
(B) did not come to being and, therefore,
causation may not exist at all. Why was
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Hume dissatisfied with just “one
definition” of causation? This is a very
important interpretive question for at least
two reasons. First, I cannot reject him as
anti-realist by virtue of his first definition
of cause. Second, I cannot ignore Hume’s
claims to the necessity of the second
definition and all that it represents: a
central element of his philosophy of
human learning.
Can Hume be truly defined by the
definitions of what is considered today to
be a realist, anti-realist, constructivist or
objectivist? For the purpose of this short
paper, I will test the following widely
understood definitions. According to
Stanford’s Philosophical Encyclopedia
(SPE), a realist, - in a metaphysical sense, is
“one who wishes to claim that apart from
the mundane sort of empirical
dependence of objects and their
properties familiar to us from everyday
life, there is no further philosophically
interesting sense, in which everyday
objects and their properties can be said to
be dependent on anyone's linguistic
practices or conceptual schemes”(SPE).
By the opposite supposition the anti-realist
rejects realism. A subjectivist doctrine
points to “knowledge as merely subjective
and that there is no external or objective
truth”(SPE). Therefore, “Our own
mental activity is the only unquestionable
fact of our experience”(SPE). According
to the Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (IEP), the term “subjective”
typically indicates the possibility of error.
An objectivist, as in reference to objective
knowledge, may simply refer to
knowledge of an objective reality by the
perceiving mind. Although this
distinction between the objective and
subjective reality may create a discrepancy
as illustrated by Locke’s example of the
icy and hot water hand experiment.
The above (IEP) definitions attempt to
define Hume’s understanding of how
human minds perceive causation between
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ideas; simple or complex, and how
humans arrive to observe, through
experience, the causes and effects and vice
versa. Hume clearly stated that the first
definition may identify a relation not
observable or clearly understood to
people at the time of observation. For
instance, the idea that “bad air”, not
plasmodium vivax virus, is a cause of
malaria. If something causes malaria in
nature, we see its effect. Yet over time, and
through careful and systematic
experimentation and experience, the true and
an intuitive cause may be inferred. For
example, not “bad air”, but a virus carried
by the mosquitoes, is the cause of malaria.
The idea of relation or causation existed
by Hume’s definition A, yet it was not
until the process of lived experience brought
about more assurance and vivacity that
definition B became suitable. I believe
Hume is very consistent in his logic of
resemblance, contiguity, and ultimately
causation. Therefore, his two definitions:
(A), and (B) were not mutually exclusive.
Hume stands by his belief that
observable causation did not originate in
reason or a priori knowledge but only in
experience. The more experience one has
regarding the relations between the ideas,
the more refined the idea of causation
may have developed. Therefore, it seems
that Hume introduced an experimental
method by way of these two definitions of
cause, which were based purely on
repeated experimentation but not reason
alone. This means that causation became
central to Hume’s method of explaining
human nature.
Today the concept of experience-based
learning (EBL) encompassed Hume’s
early ideas, and assumes that the
experience of the learner inhabits the
center of the learning process (Foley,
2000). Reflection upon experience
becomes the foundation of the learning
progress and its meaning. This approach
also assumes that learning is socially and
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culturally constructed. Not only it is a
holistic experience but one that is heavily
influenced by the individual emotions.
Hume seems to reason from factual
evidence derived from nature, according
to his two definitions of cause. He did
make a clear distinction, in which, even if
the two objects in causal relation were
connected to each other, they were still
distinct and different. Not only he was a
realist in the observation of nature (what
exists is observable) but also an objectivist
by removing possible erroneous a priori
conclusions of causation. Hume assumes
that each observation remains distinct.
For example, each throw of dice remains
distinct and not related to the previous.
Similarly, five contiguous observations do
not represent a higher spectrum of
assurance or probability in which all
further and potential observation will
remain the same.
I believe that Hume supplied the two
distinctive definitions as an experimental
method in his own quest to understand
reality and how that reality was related to
human understanding. He has, (A)
eliminated, and at the same time, (B),
introduced human bias, or individual
perception, by which causation could be
observed by definition A, yet it could not
be realistically assessed by definition B,
partly since our own imagination may
have created such causation. For instance,
a neatly cut grass in a foreign country may
suggest to someone who grew up in
contemporary California, that lawn
equipment caused it (effect). It may,
however, be that this effect was produced
by grazing animals (reality), and not by
some equipment. Thus our imagination
or habit associated the effect with our
logical conclusion (cause). The objective
reality of cause and effect exists in nature
objectively but may not be known to
human mind. The sufficient resembling
qualities of objects may suffice for
definition A, yet the demonstrative effect
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or experience must be supplied by
definition B - human experience, however
erroneous or subjective.
These two definitions: A, and B, may
also have suggested the difference, in
which Hume satisfied the objectiveness of
things as they appear in nature by way of
definition A, to a subjective relation of
objects experienced by an individual
observer through definition B. Thus the
feeling or vivacity produced by our own
imagination by way of previous
experiences may suggest a causal
relationship of a lawn mower to short
grass, or a grazing goat to short grass by
way of habits.
If the first definition was used by
Hume to explain objectivity in causal
relations in nature, then the second
definition of cause was distinctively
designed to apply to satisfy the subjective
processes of human nature. According to
Hume, mind conjoins with impressions by
way of feeling in human imagination of
the external objects (Norton et al.). This
dual approach to causality by Hume was
clearly consistent with his basic
foundations and observations (for
instance, missing shade of blue, whether
the sun will not rise tomorrow, or his
basic distinction between relations of
ideas to matters of fact), and he realized
the difficulty of his reasoning for an
average reader. He clarified in his
Enquiries, “I know not whether the reader
will readily apprehend this reasoning. I
am afraid that, should I multiply words
about it, or throw it into a greater variety
of lights, it would only become more
obscure and intricate” (Selby-Bigge et al.,
79). Since the foundation of his reasoning
regarding “matters of fact” constitutes the
idea of causation with its foundation in
“experience” of greater uniformity of
nature. For instance, white swans will
form an experience of “swans” and the
sun will rise tomorrow as it did always.
Hume’s method of induction tends to run
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a vicious circle in that we trust the process
of causation, and trust seems to be the
foundation of experience, and not perhaps
a reflection of the uniformity of natural
experience. If Hume was a realist by way
of natural observations, did he ultimately
give in to the idea of subjective experience
and human understanding? I believe that
he did arrive at the point in which the
logic of two definitions found itself in a
vicious circle of contradictions. His
theory in which observable reality (nature)
finds itself in the eye of a beholder
assumes that an observer exists, and any
process of causation exists within the
formulations of human learning.
In my opinion, Hume was keenly
aware of the natural environment and
man’s place in it. This fascination perhaps
led him to draw some basic conclusions:
(A) causation occurs as it happens in
nature (observable or not) and (B)
causation exists as it is learned by the
human mind. What is perplexing here is
perhaps the notion that (A) could not be
observed if (B) did not come to being.
Therefore, causation may not exist at all.
This notion was supported by Hume’s
writing and mentioned as follows, “If true
causation requires knowable necessary
connections, it is the required ideas that
represent impressions of causal powers in
objects, then there is not true causation at
all” (Norton et al., p. 162). Therefore, the
observation of nature becomes the
observation of human mind. This is a
constructivist base or foundation of
Hume’s theory of causation. I assume
that nature was real to Hume as it
appeared and did exist only by way of
human observation.
I believe that Hume’s two definitions
of causes account for every logical and
realistic possibility in which either nature,
which is observable, or human mind,
which expresses feelings, vivacity, or
experimentation indicate the same idea. If
there are in fact three relations between
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objects, as Hume noted: resemblance,
contiguity, and cause-effect, then these
observations relate to nature. What was
left, in Hume’s understanding, was the
philosophical or psychological field of
causation experienced by human mind? I
believe Hume was erroneous on purpose
by introducing philosophical bias or error
to his discussion on causality. He did,
perhaps, seek answers or discussions from
the intellectual community to remedy the
implicit errors of subjectivity of human
experiences and how the world should be
observed empirically.
These above formulations suggest that
Hume could be a constructivist, since he
accounted for human understanding of
nature, and he safeguarded subjective
human experiences and habits too, and
retained them within the second definition
of cause. With each example throughout
the Treatise or Enquiries, Hume suggested
objective reality, examined the subjective
reality, and reexamined the imperfections
for both cases.
Lastly, Hume’s definitions of cause
were the basis for his understanding of
the human mind. I believe that the notion
of reality that exists in nature, regardless
of human perceptions, and the reality
constructed by the human perception may
be at odds, even if the object observed
remained the same. Therefore any
theories, constructs, or narratives created
by people in human understanding may as
well be only perceived as causal relations
but not necessarily true. For instance, a
“one-size-fits-all” test approach in
education, religions, climate cycles,
science, and so on.
John Dewey, in Democracy and Education,
criticizes most philosophical traditions in
education, such as those of: Locke,
Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel,
“especially with regard to their implicit
reductionism” (Reich et al., 2016, p. 998).
Dewey rejected an a priori element of
Locke, Rousseau, and Kant and closely
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followed customary practices and habits
through which a careful analysis could be
reconstructed. Practice and experience
was the reflection of human learning,
which mirrors that of Hume. A
Skinnerian approach to behaviorism
assumes that habits and customs are
conditioned responses to the experienced
environment. In fact, these responses
could be trained as one may train for a
test. The problem here is, as pointed out
by Hume and supported by Dewey, that
the “objective” qualities of a test become
too distant to the contextual realities of
social, cultural, emotional, creative
dimensions of learning (Reich et al., 2016).
A typical example of such “objective”
learning is for example, a “one-size-fitsall” approach or teaching towards the test.
The deductive characteristic of this limited
methodology does not allow for educative
growth. It is almost as if one shaved a
coconut to get to the pre-optioned price,
as opposed to a process of cultivation of a
garden with some coconut trees among
others - not merely for its fruit but also
for the anticipated excess surplus of other
fruits, vegetables, and unknown
possibilities. These unknown possibilities
are only assumed through a “one-size-fitsall” approach, such as the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and
Development’s (OECD) (PISA) testing.
Educators assume that standardized
testing is a good predictor of an inductive
surplus of students’ success. Some of
these philosophical conclusions, I believe,
identify two important conclusive points:
1) wrongly interpreted predictive qualities
of too few observations to explain the
phenomena, as in a “one-size-fits-all”
approach, and 2) the experience of an
individual observation should stand as
unique to the observable, and any
theories, constructs, or narratives created
by people in human understanding may as
well only be perceived as causal relations
but not as necessarily true. After
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reviewing a Deweyan approach to
philosophy of education it is remarkable
how Hume’s 1740s approach to learning
through experience resonates with
Dewey’s education philosophy of 1900s.
Question 2
Hume declared in 1739 that, "Reason
is, and ought only to be the slave of the
passions, and can never pretend to any
other office than to serve and obey him”
(p. 174). How would he answer Socrates's
claim that no one ever knowingly does
wrong?
In the famous dialogue Protagoras,
Socrates asserted that, “No one goes
willingly toward the bad” (p. 124) nor ever
knowingly does wrong. As an intellectual
to whom knowledge was a virtue, and this
virtue was an integral part of knowledge
(episteme), Socrates believed that all
reasonable decisions were based on the
motivation of gain and benefit to the
decision maker, however they may seem
to others. He argued that even bad
decisions, as seen by outsiders, originated
with some calculated benefits, however
short-lived. Miscalculation is possible and
often occurs and could be comparable to
the miscalculations of the size of objects
seen from a distance. In this example, no
one intends to commit error that may be
harmful as a consequence, but at the same
time, no one possesses the correct
knowledge to make a totally error-free
decision. This skill could be learned or
taught, Socrates argues, and thus logically
explains that virtue and knowledge could
be acquired, therefore, the harmful effects
could be remedied by knowledge and
education.
Unlike Socrates, Hume argues, “that
reason alone can never be a motive to any
action of the will; and that it can never
oppose passion in the direction of the
will” (Norton et al., p.260). This stance is
very anti-intellectual and a counterpoint to
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the virtue of reason argued by Socrates.
Hume delegates reason as doubtful, blind,
inconstant, and deceitful to passions
defined as “the internal impressions we
feel and are conscious of, when we
knowingly give rise to any new motion of
our body or new perception of our mind”
(Norton et al., p. 266). In addition, virtues
as the basis for informed and correct
decisions argued by Socrates, are rejected
by Hume, who states that even,
“demonstrative reasoning (math) never
influences our actions, but only directs
our judgement concerning causes and
effects; which leads us to the second
operation of the understanding” prospects of pain and pleasure (p. 267).
Hume believes that reason’s role is simply
that of assistance and not the originator in
decision-making, and, “This is from the
prospect of pain or pleasure that the
aversion or propensity arises towards any
object” (p. 267) through processes of
cause and effect and experience. Since
reason only assists with the connections
required for causal affects, reason alone
can never produce or prevent any action
that is formed primarily by impulse of
passion. As a consequence, Hume
proclaims that, “Reason is and ought only
to be the slave of the passions, and can
never pretend to any other office than to
serve and obey them” (p. 268).
One of the greatest differences
between the Socratic and Humean
approach is the role of reason, virtue, and
knowledge in the process of influencing
motives of the will. What sets them both
apart is the fundamental approach, in
ancient and modern philosophy, to the
combat between passion and reason.
Socrates argues for reason and knowledge
in decision-making, while Hume for
passions by way of subservient reason’s
assistance. Hume uses reason as an
instrument to figure out causation, which
is the foundation of Hume’s human
understanding. Practically speaking of
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Hume, human reason only enables the
necessary connections needed for
behavioral mechanisms or learning. At the
same time, reason is part of the
practicality of the process in which some
decisions may be deemed by reason as
unreasonable. Therefore, causation or
experiences may be re-examined by this
reasonable process. This perhaps could
be learned but mostly experienced to ease
or to facilitate the causation process. I
believe that Hume’s theory of behavior
motivation or action as he defined it lies in
his basic mechanical foundations. By this,
I mean the very behavioral-like conditions
of the mechanisms of how humans
understand and behave, such as;
causation, experience, motivation toward
pleasure, and aversion from pain. His
approach deems reason partly needed to
sort out the unknowns or uncorrelated
from the greater mill of causation.
Hume’s approach reminds me of a blank
canvas of human mind or a computer
without software, which only becomes
something after some initially injected or
experienced new data in order to make
sense of undoubtedly chaotic streams of
foreign and unrelated information. Since
Hume rejects a priori construction of
human mind, this approach leaves him no
room to consider human reason in
broader terms. Socrates, on the other
hand, attempts to build a cognitive world
with human reason as virtue (knowledge)
at its center. He does not have to reject
reason as secondary to human passion,
since his theory is not based in the
mechanical concepts of ideas,
impressions, connections, or causality.
The Socratic approach to lived experience
is purely complementary to its influences
on the cognitive abilities of human mind.
It is reason and knowledge to which
experience is complementary and often
necessary. If lived experience is missing,
which it may be, the equivalent value may
be learned.
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Hume rejects the assertion that
morality is born from reason or that it is a
product of reason alone. He continues
that vice and immorality are not found in
causes and effects but only in the
sentiments of the observers. His
discussions on demonstrative reasoning
described the relations of ideas but not
virtues or vices, which are not part of the
process of resemblance, contiguity, or
cause and effect. His anti-rationalist
approach is best illustrated by his
representation of argument in which
passions, volition, and actions can be
neither reasonable nor unreasonable.
Since reason cannot provide action,
morality then must be somehow
connected to passions that generate
actions. This is a very important assertion
by Hume who disconnects reason from
morality. Hume agrees that people will
commit to some obligations by way of the
simple mechanism that assumes a certain
degree of reward (pleasure) or pain if
action is not taken or taken to a certain
expectation. He rejects Hobbesian
societal obligation or action of some sort
of intuitive thinking bound by the social
covenant but agrees that some could do it
to satisfy their appetites of passion or selfinterest. This is not to say that Socrates
and Hume are in concert here. Socrates
confronts the idea of innate wrongdoing
by human mind, and argues that such is
purely done out of ignorance of facts.
Hume, on the other hand, rejects the
general consensus that people may be dogooders by reason alone, and introduces
self-interest as if in a contractual
relationship that posits trust and
predictability that could be rewarded or
punished through pain and pleasure. In
fact, I believe that Hume follows closely
Newtonian principles by way of finding
causes for everything that happens
concerning human mind. Hume does not
treat virtues as some sort of a priori
instinct or understanding delivered and
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implanted by God, and he explains them
as a psychologist in need of finding cause
to an effect.
Hume could certainly respond to
Socrates that human emotions are
contiguous and depend on signs of a
sentiment sent from one to another
(Norton et al., p. 238). In such a way, we
do feel sentiments, not goodness
described by Socrates. Since Hume
defines sympathy as the propensity to act,
all communication and clues from the
outside world are just indications from
others. Therefore, decisions and will
bring action from passions based on the
sentiments received. Reason, only sorts
out the irregularities resulting from the
differences between our sentiments and
those exhibited or experienced by others.
Simply, Humean process is very
mechanical, it excludes a priori morality
that Socrates believed was heavily vested
in human behavior, and strictly depends
on sentiments, or impressions’ clues from
others. If others are immoral and act out
of viciousness, Humean process would
copy this behavior, however
contradictory, and provide action similar
to that observed. Hume states that the
greater concept of morality does not exist.
We are merely copying each other. After
reading Treatise I and II, what I believe is
a difference, between Hume’s and
Socrates’ positions on the fundamentals of
human will, is to do with the mechanics of
behavioral and cognitive process. To
Hume, reason is secondary to passions,
while to Socrates reason and virtue are the
catalysts for everything that follows. I
assert that Hume expects all human
beings to resemble each other in all
functions of life, including that of reason,
therefore, the impressions of ideas shared
between humans and the vivacity and
feeling they produce vary in individuals
based on their sentiments. This
contradicts Socrates on the basis of an a
priori concept of goodness and morality,
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and it is doubtful that Socrates could
accept such mechanics in the human will.
What guides Socratic concepts in which
“no one knowingly does anything wrong”
is a greater argument of self-betterment.
In Humean philosophy this a priori
concept of ubiquity of morality is replaced
by the mechanics of copied impressions,
which, in turn, are agreed by the society as
acceptable, since morality, as it is known
to Socrates, does not exist in Hume. The
dichotomy of the battle between reason
and passions does not exist in Hume’s
writing, and no amount of learning or
knowledge will change that, instead, the
idea of the liveliness (vivacity) of the
impressions create a sentiment that is
morally neutral, a dramatic change to that
of Socratic thinking. Lastly, I believe, that
similarly to Socrates, Hume asserts that
human understanding or will is subject to
the concept of the prevalence of selfinterest in Socratic understanding, and the
pleasure principle in Hume’s writing.
Therefore, the greater morality is created
by copying the impressions from people
around, which become lived experiences
in Humean understanding, therefore
morally accepted as normative. In such
way, virtue is created by the copying
mechanism, impressions, resemblance,
cause and effect, and greater reward of
pleasure or penalty of pain, but not reason
alone. I think Hume would reject the
Socratic concept of a priori morality and
goodness as if implanted by God or
nature, and he would defend the
Newtonian mechanism of causality in
nature as the only way to derive truths
about human understanding.
The teaching of ethics underlines
exactly this idea, where an a priori concept
of ethics is absent among students, and a
new normative morality is built by
experience, and more like a social policy.
In this process, a student assumes that
ethical behavior is an institutional policy
that may or may not be applicable outside
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of the classroom’s frameworks. I believe,
that students’ ethical behavior varies
depending on the level of experience,
institutional proximity, and social
adaptability of learned ethics.
The implications of Humean Akratic
approach to the field of education could
suggest that cheating, for example, may
not be immoral or set within individual
boundaries of morality but as a product of
practice or a construct. For instance, new
exposure to newly introduced “morality
boundaries,” where cheating is not
allowed, creates new sets of parameters of
morality to which an individual will adjust.
The initial punishment for “cheating”
becomes immoral as a contradiction to
the prior experience, assuming cheating
was prevalent and somehow acceptable in
the past, and any consequence of past
cheating in the newly constructed morality
of “no cheating” cannot be held against
the individual where it becomes itself
illogical. After all, Hume insisted that, just
because we have experienced five
consecutive occurrences of white swans, it
does not mean that the next swan to be
seen will in fact be guaranteed to be white.
This logic if applied to cheating instances
or investigations among students assumes
illogical assumptions that past experience
will inference the future. It is easier to
assume that cheating “morality” is socially
constructed, and has nothing to do with
an innate human sense of morality, at least
in Humean meaning. According to
Strom’s (2008) study quoting Sommers
and Satel (2005), “Dishonesty in school is
merely a reflection of the broader erosion
of ethical behavior which has become
commonplace in societies that tend to
support self-centeredness over concern
for others” (p. 107). Another observation
in the same study suggests that, “Teachers
are partially responsible because they
ignore evidence of character failure and
choose not to hold students accountable”
(p. 107). In light of Strom's study, the
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established experience of felt lack of
responsibility and accountability by the
students reinforces the motivation to
cheat as a socially “constructed” clue from
the environment. An approach of
originality through which a meaningful
new project or essay on the information
gathered by the writer in the form of
observations, interviews, or experiments
could generate a new “constructed” norm.
Therefore, a whole set of newly
“constructed” assignments based on a
new set of guidelines could reset the
expectation of the norm. Using oral
critique, reflectivity, an ongoing revision
process of improving the final product of
a project, including its public presentation
could break the cycle of plagiarism. This
is to say that the entire nature of the
assignments should reflect the new
Bloom’s-like taxonomy approach.
Question 3
What is Hume claiming in the famous
is-ought passage of Book III, Part 1,
Section I? Is he claiming that you cannot
get an ought from an is (R. M. Hare calls
this "Hume's Law") or is he claiming
something altogether different, even
contrary to this? How does his position
relate to the statistical sampling debate in
the field of education?
The famous passage representing the
last paragraph of Book III, Part I, Section
I, of Hume’s Treatise has been analyzed
and discussed by many who either find
the Humean approach to human morality
contradictory or completely consistent
with [Hume’s] “notions on the
imperfections and narrow limits of human
understanding”(p. 301). In this short
analysis, I argue that Hume attempts to
discredit the doctrines and the dogmas of
orthodox religious beliefs. What Hume
says is:
In every system of morality, which I
have hitherto met with, I have always
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remarked, that the author proceeds
for some time in the ordinary way of
reasoning, and establishes the being of
a God, or makes observations
concerning human affairs; when of a
sudden I am surprised to find, that
instead of the usual copulations of
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with
no proposition that is not connected
with an ought, or an ought not. This
change is imperceptible; but is,
however, of the last consequence. For
as this ought, or ought not, expresses
some new relation or affirmation, this
necessary that it should be observed
and explained; and at the same time
that a reason should be given, for
what seems altogether inconceivable,
how this new relation can be a
deduction from others, which are
entirely different from it … I shall
presume to recommend it to the
reader; and am persuaded, that this
small attention would subvert all the
vulgar systems of morality, and let us
see, that the distinction of vice and
virtue is not founded merely on the
relations of objects, nor is perceived
by reason. (p. 302)
A typical interpretation of this passage
is that morals come from the matters of fact
and any immoral act, such as a murder, is
reasoned to be wrong. One can also infer
that morals are not part of the matters of
fact, and morality is simply arbitrary and
found in the relations of ideas. Although
this may sound utterly confusing and
contradictory to most readers of Hume, I
believe that Hume pragmatically delivers
his skepticism towards the narrowness of
human or societal “systems” of
understanding. Hume attempts to
demonstrate that the only principles or
“systems” available to people are
discovered by his non-codified principles
of association: resemblance, contiguity,
and causality. Most codified principles
with which Hume did not agree are too

https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/wie/vol7/iss1/3

limiting for human free understanding and
include among others: religious ethics’
“Ten Commandments,” the dualities or
dichotomy of arguments from Descartes,
and even Newtonian principles. Hume
argues that the deductive qualities of the
scientific method are too rigid, and bound
already by an arbitrary limit, therefore
unfree and not open enough to
experiment. The skeptical approach to
the scientific method, in Hume’s
estimation, delivers unbounded
possibilities, including the basic
understanding of morality and perhaps God. I believe, Hume hints at the
possibility that the only reality that exists
is one that is perceived by our senses,
experiences, and causation. For instance,
take for example saying that God exists
equals a statement of fact or selfexplanatory demonstration that the
existence is true. Hume cannot
demonstratively prove that God exists
(for instance, 2+2=4) but he insists, likely
because of his critics, that the complex
world that exists is a demonstrative fact
on its own, fully observable and
experienced in reality, therefore created by
supreme intelligence or intellect, and most
likely God. Hume’s calibration of this
statement could be interpreted by the
following: if God is believed to exist, and
all signs point to intelligent design (reality
of the world), therefore God ought to exist
by habitual belief (religion) or the
experience of the world. If experience is
the only way to understand, and a concept
of God may be experienced by habit, it is
only natural for our senses to experience
God. This does not demonstrate God’s
existence by Hume’s method, instead, we
only know particular impressions, beliefs,
and causations of the idea of God or
religion. In a similar way, a missing shade
of color may be reproduced or even
experienced by an individual by way of
resemblance or habit, even if such shade
of color does not exist. I believe that
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Hume fully demonstrated his point here
on (non)existence of God.
I make sense of Hume’s position on
morality from the perspective in which
the moral code (virtues and vices) ought or
is are bound within the matters of fact. Only
experience, and not a priori knowledge can
determine the understanding by way of
habit and causality. This skeptical
approach builds up understanding by not
deducing from the established principles
(for example, Catholic ethics) but by
forming from bottom up vis a vis the
Humean trivium (resemblance, contiguity,
causality). Hume argues that we cannot
prove the universal a priori morality, and
he implies that only experience, or its lack,
makes our own perception of belief.
There is no set standard of morality
among rational beings, thus a savage
behavior elsewhere may be just as
normative as attending church services in
Scotland. The morality, as Hume sees it,
is as fluid as the breadth of our experience
with or without it. For instance, most
would agree to call a patricidal murder an
immoral act, but not many could see a
parity of that act to a patricide between an
oak tree and its sapling.
What I find contradictory is Hume’s
Enquiry position on belief in a divine judge
and its sanctioned effects on morality
(Selby-Bigge, 1996, p. 147). In Enquiry,
Hume states that having the idea of the
final judgment [religiously speaking]
creates the impression of necessity, pain
or pleasure, and certain fulfilling moral
conduct. This naturally does not prove
that God is and exists, but it insinuates
posterior belief that God ought to exist (a
contradiction).
I believe that Hume, through his
systematic skeptical critique, attempts to
discredit the doctrines and dogmas of
orthodox religious belief. He cannot do it
openly by proclaiming that God is dead,
but he does it through a kitchen door - his
lack of piety and clever attacks on theism.
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For Hume, morality is a fully practical and
experience-based affair that sanctions,
conforms, or motivates behavior. In my
opinion, this mechanical approach to
morality creates an idea of program-like
behavior, and generates a notion of a
passive mind that only reacts to
perceptions and impressions. Hume
modifies Locke’s idea of “tabula rasa,”
and Berkeley’s conclusion of “to be is to
be perceived,” and formulates a skeptical
platform in which “no ideas are innate”.
This assertion is monumental for Hume,
and a foundation for behaviorism in the
field of education. Therefore, all learning
is experience-based. Human learning, for
Hume, exists in a loop of exposure,
experience, and habit. Although Hume
did not write on education in particular,
he did describe a Skinnerian theory of
learning. It has no a priori construct,
therefore, all that is known is simply
reproduced, learned, and generated based
on the senses and causal relations. A
person can have an idea of an apple or a
tree, but human understanding can also
erroneously imagine (relate) a mermaid or
a unicorn, that become habitually real yet
do not exist. Hume presents a valid
logical argument in which the existence of
God could be comparable to that of the
existence of a mermaid or a unicorn, and
the only skeptical methodology to find the
truth is the experience alone.
If Hume himself commits inferences
from is to ought on several occasions and
at the same time suggests that an ought
cannot be derived from an is, could the
key to decipher what Hume really meant
be based on the argumentation and its
moral or ethical acuteness? When
combined with Hume’s fork, the ought-is
designation creates a problem in which
there is a possibility of no moral
knowledge. Morality is not selfdemonstrative as it is not universal, but a
morality could be experienced, yet
questioned based on the individual
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experience. If such possibility exists
according to Hume, the is-ought statement
creates a contradiction that threatens the
validity of morality or ethics by implying
subjective and arbitrary judgments. The
logic of this argument rejects the
argumentation of ethics as the key to this
riddle.
The pragmatism of Hume seeing the
idea about the idea, lies in the fact that
ideas are not there to be discovered but to
be used as tools of experience in order to
understand the world. Collectively, ideas
become social tools and entirely
dependent upon people and their
environment of which morality, ethics, or
religion becomes a human creation. Since
all ideas, according to Hume, are based on
the real-world experience, a new reality of
today’s social media tools, such as,
gathered information on trends, fashion,
art, and meta-data “re-create” the
perceived world. By eliminating objective
knowledge, Hume attacks the permeated
“objectivity” as the basis for traditional
philosophical and scientific discourse and
introduces a new creative approach. The
experience-based approach, and not the
universally held norms, are, according to
Hume, the truest reflections of reality
(human and nature centered but not
superstitious or religious).
Overall, Hume is remarkably
pragmatic, he relies on coherent accounts
of human experience, he excludes the
possibilities of erroneous turns, such as;
the superstitions or unfounded
connections “oughts from is,” and builds

from ground up a new experimental
method of human understanding that is
based solely on the mechanical premise of
the perceptions and human experiences to
include his position on religion. The
experience-based approach to education,
in the postmodern sense of
understanding, drives and exposes humancentered accounts of human experience,
which may not be universal, and applies
them to the greater understanding and
developing of our educational curriculum.
We teach and test ourselves to avoid is to
ought errors through evidence-based
research. While we rely on the statistical
inferences of the future or sampled
observations, our limited approach relies
heavily on the Humean ought to, rather
than is. By analyzing this third question, I
cannot help but to stress the importance
of a qualitative approach to educational
research, where a single observation or a
piece of evidence is analyzed for the
qualities that are observable without
committing the inferential “ought” of
probabilities that tend to fit or diminish
the “is”. The “affinity of researchers”
with certain kinds of people, designs, data,
theories, concepts, or explanations
(Norris, 1997) introduce biases, which are
embedded in the exact process described
by Hume. Consequently some biases,
including “the sampling of times, places,
events, people, issues, questions and the
balance between the dramatic and the
mundane,” find their way into research as
unavoidable and reflective of is to ought
errors (p. 174).
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